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The Supreme Court and Abortion Rights
George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1973 abortion-rights decision in Roe v. Wade,1 the law has
taken the lead in defining the contours of the
continuing public debate over reproductive liberty.
Ever since then, abortion opponents have tried to
make abortion more burdensome by limiting Roe,
and these continuing challenges are the reason
there have been so many Supreme Court decisions
about abortion, including the Court’s 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,2 which unexpectedly reaffirmed the
core of Roe.
In the wake of Casey, political efforts to restrict
abortion have switched to outlawing one specific
medical procedure, which its opponents label
“partial-birth abortion,” and more than 30 states
and the federal government have made it a crime
to perform this procedure. In 2000, in Stenberg
v. Carhart,3 the Court ruled 5 to 4 that these laws
are unconstitutional. In April 2007, also by a 5 to
4 vote, the Court reached the opposite conclusion
in Gonzales v. Carhart.4 This is the first time the
Court has ever held that physicians can be prohibited from using a medical procedure deemed
necessary by the physician to benefit the patient’s
health. The importance of the decision to physicians and their patients cannot be appreciated
without an understanding of the constitutional
law of reproductive liberty as it has developed
during the past 40 years.

the right to privac y
The first case to embrace the concept of reproductive liberty was Griswold v. Connecticut, in which
the Court ruled in 1965 that a Connecticut statute
criminalizing the use of contraceptives violated
the constitutional right to privacy that married
couples had in sexual relations.5 Later, in 1972,
the Court found that even outside marriage, a person had a “right to privacy . . . to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision to bear or beget a child.”6
n engl j med 356;21

The following year, in Roe, the Court struck
down a Texas law that made it a crime for physicians to perform an abortion unless it was necessary to save the life of the patient; there were no
exceptions for the woman’s health. The Court
held that women have a constitutional right of
privacy that is fundamental and “broad enough
to encompass a woman’s decision . . . to terminate her pregnancy.”1 Because the right is fundamental, states that wish to restrict abortion rights
were required to demonstrate a compelling interest to restrict the exercise of this right. The Court
ruled that the state’s interest in the life of the
fetus became compelling only at the point of viability, when the fetus can survive independently
of its mother. Even after the point of viability, the
state cannot favor the life of the fetus over the
life or health of the pregnant woman. Under
the right of privacy, physicians must be free to
use their “medical judgment for the preservation
of the life or health of the mother.”1 On the same
day that the Court decided Roe, it also decided
Doe v. Bolton,7 in which the Court defined health
very broadly:
The medical judgment may be exercised in
the light of all factors — physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the
woman’s age — relevant to the well-being
of the patient. All these factors may relate
to health. This allows the attending physician the room he needs to make his best
medical judgment.7
Roe and Doe together established that both phy
sician and patient were protected by the constitutional right of privacy. In later cases, the Court
continued to defer to the medical judgment of
the attending physician. For example, in 1976 in
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, the
Court concluded that state legislatures could not
determine when viability occurred; rather this
“essentially medical concept . . . is, and must
be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible
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attending physician.”8 By the end of the 1980s,
a pattern in Court decisions could be discerned
in which abortion regulations that significantly
burdened a woman’s decision, treated abortion
differently from other similar medical or surgical procedures, interfered with the exercise of
professional judgment by the attending physician,
or were stricter than accepted medical standards
were struck down by the Court.9
Privacy as a constitutional right became a oneword description of liberty to make decisions
regarding marriage, procreation, contraception,
sterilization, abortion, family relationships, child
rearing, and sexual relationships free of governmental interference.2,10

the right to liber t y
One strategy to change Roe was to change the
composition of the Supreme Court by appointing
anti-Roe justices. Because of new justices on the
Court in 1992, in Casey, the Court had its first real
opportunity to overturn Roe v. Wade. Many Court
observers thought it would. Instead, in an unusual procedure for the Court, three potentially
anti-Roe justices, Justices Sandra Day O’Connor,
David Souter, and Anthony Kennedy, joined together to write a joint opinion confirming the
“core holding” of Roe. (They were joined in most
of their opinion by two justices who would have
simply upheld Roe, making this a 5-to-4 decision.)
Most centrally, the authors of the joint opinion
believed that although the pressure to overrule
Roe has grown “more intense,” doing so would
severely and unnecessary damage the Court’s
legitimacy by undermining “the Nation’s commit
ment to the rule of law.”2
Specifically, the three justices wrote that they
were reaffirming “Roe’s essential holding” that
before the point of viability a woman has a right
to choose abortion without undue state interference, that after the point of viability the state can
restrict abortion “if the law contains exceptions
for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life
or health,” and that “the state has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of
the fetus that may become a child.” The Court
applied these principles to uphold laws mandating much more detailed requirements for abortion, as well as a mandatory 24-hour waiting
period, but struck down a spousal-notification
2202
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requirement as an “undue burden.” Thus, after
Casey, Roe stood for the proposition that pregnant
women have a “personal liberty” right (“privacy”
went unmentioned) to choose to terminate their
pregnancies before the point of viability and that
the state cannot “unduly burden” such a right
by erecting barriers that effectively prevent the
exercise of that choice.2,11 Of course, a major
problem was definitional: burdensome regulations were acceptable, “unduly burdensome” ones
were not — but it was not clear what qualified
as which. Put another way, the state could demonstrate its concern for life by requiring that
physicians make women seeking abortions jump
through new and burdensome hoops (including
offers of detailed and accurate information on
abortion, the status of the fetus, adoption, sources
of help for childbirth, and a 24-hour waiting
period), as long as doing so did not “unduly burden” women by actually preventing them from being able to make a decision to have an abortion.
With the loss of all hope that the Court
would overrule Roe wholesale, anti-Roe advocates
switched strategies dramatically, focusing on
criminalizing a specific procedure that they believed would horrify most Americans and that
they labeled “partial-birth abortion.” The first
such bill passed Congress in 1996 and was vetoed
by President Bill Clinton because the prohibition
did not contain an exception for the health of the
woman, as required by Roe and Casey. In 1997,
this time with the support of the American Medical Association, the bill passed Congress again.
President Clinton vetoed it, again for failure to
contain a health exception.12

“ par tial- bir th a b or tion ”
and the s tate s
Proponents of the ban took their cause to the
individual states, a majority of which enacted substantially identical laws. In 2000, Nebraska’s
partial-birth abortion law reached the Supreme
Court. The Nebraska law carried a penalty of up
to 20 years in prison for physicians who performed
the procedure. The law reads in relevant part:
No partial-birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such a procedure is necessary to save the life of the
mother whose life is endangered by a
physical disorder, physical illness, or phys-
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ical injury, including a life-endangering
physical condition caused by or arising
from the pregnancy itself.

cal profession or society as a whole to become
insensitive, even disdainful, to life, including life
of the human fetus.” He also argued that such a
ban was not unduly burdensome to women because state legislatures can determine that specific medical procedures, like this one, are not
medically necessary.3

[A “partial-birth abortion” is] an abortion
procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing
the unborn child and completing the
delivery. . . . [The statute further defines
the phrase “partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn
child” as] deliberately and intentionally
delivering into the vagina a living unborn
child, or a substantial portion thereof, for
the purpose of performing a procedure
that the person performing such pro
cedure knows will kill the unborn child
and does kill the unborn child3 [emphasis
added].

“ par tial- bir th a b or tion ”
and congre ss

This ban applies throughout pregnancy and
has no exception to protect the woman’s health,
only to save her life. In a 5-to-4 opinion in Sten
berg v. Carhart,3,13 the Court found this law unconstitutional for two reasons. First, the description of the banned procedure was too close to
dilation and evacuation (D&E), another procedure
that was permitted and widely used for secondtrimester abortions. Therefore, this law would
discourage physicians from using the lawful procedure, which would place an undue burden on
their patients. Second, the law failed to provide
an exception for instances in which the procedure was deemed necessary by the physician to
protect the woman’s health, as required by Roe
and Casey. Justice John Paul Stevens, in his concurring opinion, noted that the extreme anti-Roe
rhetoric as exemplified in the partial-birth abortion debate obscured the fact that during the 27year period since Roe was decided, the core holding of Roe “has been endorsed by all but 4 of the
17 Justices who have addressed the issue.”3
A notable dissenting opinion was written by
Justice Kennedy, who had specifically endorsed
the core of Roe in Casey. Kennedy argued that the
outlawing of “partial-birth abortion” was consistent with Casey because of the interest the state
has throughout pregnancy in protecting the life
of the fetus that may become a child. In his view,
the banned procedure conflates abortion and
childbirth in a way that “might cause the medi-

n engl j med 356;21

Justice Stephen Breyer, the author of the Stenberg
majority opinion, stated that a more precise law,
with a health exception, could be constitutional.3
In 2003, Congress passed a slightly revised law.
It did not contain a health exception, but its preface did contain a declaration that the outlawed
procedure was never medically necessary for the
health of the woman. President Bush signed it
into law on November 5, 2003. By the time the
Court ruled on the constitutionality of this law
in April 2007, in Gonzales v. Carhart, there were
two important changes in the composition of the
Court: a new chief justice, John Roberts, who replaced the consistently anti-Roe Chief William
Rehnquist, and Justice Samuel Alito, who replaced
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who was consistently pro-Roe (as interpreted in Casey). The federal
law provides that
(a) Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly
performs a partial birth abortion and
thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more
than 2 years, or both. This subsection does
not apply to a partial birth abortion that is
necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is
endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a
life-endangering physical condition caused
by or arising from the pregnancy itself. . . .
(b) (1) The term “partial birth” abortion
means an abortion in which the person
performing the abortion
(A) Deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a
head-first presentation, the entire fetal head
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is outside the body of the mother, or, in the
case of breech presentation, any part of the
fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the
mother, for the purpose of performing an
overt act that the person knows will kill
the partially delivered living fetus; and
(B) Performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially
delivered living fetus4 [emphasis added].
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procedure “confuses the medical, legal and ethical duties of physicians to preserve and promote
life. . . .” 4
The key to Kennedy’s legal analysis is his conclusion that these reasons are constitutionally
sufficient to justify the ban because under Casey
“the State, from the inception of pregnancy,
maintains its own regulatory interest in protecting the life of the fetus that may become a child
[and this interest] cannot be set at naught by interpreting Casey’s requirement of a health exception so it becomes tantamount to allowing the
doctor to choose the abortion method he or she
might prefer.” 4
Kennedy then goes on to write that “respect
for human life finds an ultimate expression in the
bond of love the mother has for her child,” and
that “while no reliable data” exist on the subject,
“it seems unexceptionable to conclude some wom
en come to regret their choice to abort the infant
life they once created and sustained. . . . Severe
depression and loss of esteem can follow.” Such
regret, Justice Kennedy believes, can be caused
or exacerbated if women later learn what the procedure entails, suggesting that physicians fail to
describe it to patients because they “may prefer
not to disclose precise details of the means [of
abortion] that will be used. . . .” 4
The final, important issue is whether the prohibition would “ever impose significant health
risks on women” and whether physicians or Congress should make this determination. Kennedy
picks Congress: “The law need not give abortion
doctors unfettered choice in the course of their
medical practice, nor should it elevate their status
above other physicians in the medical commu
nity. . . . Medical uncertainty does not foreclose
the exercise of legislative power in the abortion
context any more than it does in other contexts.” 4
Furthermore, Kennedy argues, the law does not
impose an “undue burden” on women for another reason: alternative ways of killing a fetus
have not been prohibited. In his words, “If the
intact D&E procedure is truly necessary in some
circumstances, it appears likely an injection that
kills the fetus is an alternative under the Act that
allows the doctor to perform the procedure.” 4

The Court decided, 5 to 4, that this law was
constitutional. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion for himself, Justices Antonin Scalia and
Clarence Thomas, and the two new justices. In it
he substantially adopts his dissenting opinion in
Stenberg as the Court’s new majority opinion. Although he concludes that his decision is consistent with Stenberg, all three U.S. District courts
and all three Courts of Appeal that had examined this federal law found it unconstitutional
under the principles in Casey and Stenberg, primarily because of the vagueness of the definition and
the lack of a health exception.4
As to the vagueness argument, Kennedy writes
that the new law is no longer vague because it
clarifies the distinction between the prohibited
procedure (which he calls “intact D&E”) and standard D&E abortions because the former requires
the delivery of an intact fetus, whereas the latter
requires “the removal of fetal parts that are ripped
from the fetus as they are pulled through the
cervix.” In addition, the new federal law specifies
fetal landmarks (e.g., the “navel”) instead of the
vague description of a “substantial portion” of
the “unborn child.”4
Since the law applies to fetuses both before
and after the point of viability, Kennedy concedes
that under Casey the law would be unconstitutional “if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability.” 4
Kennedy finds Congress’s purpose is twofold:
first, lawmakers wanted to “express respect for
the dignity of human life” by outlawing “a
method of abortion in which a fetus is killed
just inches before completion of the birth process,” because use of this procedure “will further coarsen society to the humanity of not
jus tice gins b ur g ’ s dissent
only newborns, but of all vulnerable and innocent human life. . . .” Second, Congress want- Writing for the four justices in the minority, Jused to protect medical ethics, finding that this tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg observes, “Today’s de2204
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cision is alarming. It refuses to take Casey and
Stenberg seriously. It tolerates, indeed applauds,
federal intervention to ban nationwide a procedure found necessary and proper in certain cases
by the American College of Obstetricians (ACOG).
It blurs the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between
previability and postviability abortions. And, for
the first time since Roe, the Court blesses a prohibition with no exception safeguarding a woman’s health.” 4
Ginsburg argues that the majority of the Court
has overruled the conclusion in Stenberg that a
health exception is required when “substantial
medical authority supports the proposition that
banning a particular abortion procedure could
endanger women’s health. . . .”4 This conclusion,
bolstered by evidence presented by nine professional organizations, including the ACOG, and
conclusions by all three U.S. District Courts that
heard evidence concerning the Act and its effects,
directly contradicted the congressional declaration that “there is no credible medical evidence
that partial-birth abortions are safe or are safer
than other abortion procedures.” Even Justice
Kennedy agreed that Congress’s finding was untenable.
Justice Ginsburg concludes that this leaves
only “flimsy and transparent justifications” for
upholding the ban. She rejects those justifications, arguing that the state’s interest in “preserv
ing and promoting fetal life” cannot be furthered
by a ban that targets only a method of abortion
and that cannot save “a single fetus from destruction” by its own terms but may put women’s
health at risk.4 Ultimately, she believes that the
decision rests entirely on the proposition, never
before enshrined in a majority opinion and explicitly repudiated in Casey, that “ethical and moral concerns” unrelated to the government’s interest in “preserving life” can overcome what had
been considered fundamental rights of citizens.
The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion by
describing pregnant women as in a fragile emotional state that physicians may take advantage
of by withholding information about abortion
procedures. Justice Ginsburg concludes that the
majority’s solution to this hypothetical problem
is to “deprive women of the right to make an
autonomous choice, even at the expense of their
safety.” 4 She continues, “This way of thinking
[that men must protect women by restricting their
choices] reflects ancient notions about women’s

n engl j med 356;21

place in the family and under the Constitution
— ideas that have long since been discredited.”4
Ginsburg further notes that the majority simply cannot contain its hostility to reproductive
rights as articulated in Roe and Casey, calling physicians “abortion doctors,” describing the fetus
as an “unborn child” and as a “baby,” labeling
second-trimester abortions as “late term,” and
dismissing “the reasoned medical judgments of
highly trained doctors . . . as ‘preferences’ motivated by ‘mere convenience.’”4
Ginsburg makes two final points. First, although the Court invites a lawsuit to challenge
the Act “as applied,” it gives “no clue” as to how
such a lawsuit should be brought. Surely, she asks,
“the Court cannot mean that no suit to challenge the ban [based on how it affects an actual
woman or her physician] may be brought until
a woman’s health is immediately jeopardized.”
Second, she argues that the opinion threatens to
undercut the “rule of law” and the “principle of
stare decisis,” both of which the Court affirmed
in Casey, concluding that, “A decision so at odds
with our jurisprudence should not have staying
power.”4 As described in Casey, stare decisis is a
doctrine that obligates courts to follow the principles set forth in prior cases, called precedents, to
assure continuity in the law, and precedents should
not be abandoned under “political pressure” or as
an “unprincipled emotional reaction.”2

discussion
The major change in the law this opinion brings
with it is the new willingness of Congress and
the Court to disregard the health of pregnant
women and the medical judgment of their physicians.14‑16 This departure from precedent was
made possible by categorizing physicians as unprincipled “abortion doctors” and infantilizing
pregnant women as incapable of making serious
decisions about their lives and health. The majority opinion ignores or marginalizes long-standing
principles of constitutional law, substituting the
personal morality of Justice Kennedy and four of
his colleagues.
The majority asserts that giving Congress constitutional authority to regulate medical practice
is not new but identifies no case in which Congress had ever outlawed a medical procedure. Its
reliance on the more than 100-year-old case of
Jacobson v. Massachusetts is especially inapt.17 Jacob-
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son was about mandatory smallpox vaccination
during an epidemic. The statute had an exception for “children who present a certificate,
signed by a registered physician, that they are
unfit subjects for vaccination,” and the Court implied that a similar medical exception would be
constitutionally required for adults. It is not just
abortion regulations that have had a health exception for physicians and their patients — all
health regulations have.16‑18
On the other hand, those who expect Roe to
be overturned by this Court may be disappointed. Although Justice Alito has replaced Justice
O’Connor and is likely to vote in the opposite
direction on Roe-related issues, Justice Kennedy
is the new swing vote on the Court, and he insists that he is upholding the principles of Roe v.
Wade as reaffirmed in Casey.3 Just as the question of whether a specific abortion regulation was
an “undue burden” was once a determination
Justice O’Connor could effectively make for the
Court, the meaning of Roe v. Wade is, at least for
now, up to Justice Kennedy.

conclusions
Some physicians will surely be tempted to view
the decision as a narrow victory for antiabortion
forces that is unlikely to have more than a marginal effect on medical practice. This view is understandable but misses the potential broader im
pact of the opinion on the regulation of medical
practice and the doctor–patient relationship generally. Until this opinion, the Court recognized
the importance of not interfering with medical
judgments made by physicians to protect a patient’s interest.16 For the first time, the Court
permits congressional judgment to replace medical judgment.
For physicians who are disturbed or dismayed
by this opinion — for example, the ACOG has
termed it “shameful and incomprehensible”19 —
there are concrete actions to consider. One is to
seek an amendment of the act in Congress to
protect women’s health — for instance, by adding
a specific exemption for cases in which “in the
reasonable medical judgment of the attending
physician, an alternative procedure poses a signif
icant risk to the health of the pregnant woman.”
Although it would be better simply to repeal
the law, this amendment could actually pass because it permits legislators to be against using
2206
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the despised procedure but at the same time protecting the health of women.
A second, admittedly much more difficult, response is for physicians to become conscientious
objectors in particular circumstances. This means
doctors will do what is medically necessary to
preserve and protect the lives and health of
their patients as required by medical ethics, regardless of what politicians attempt to dictate.
Unlike antiabortion conscientious objection, this
kind does not come with legal immunity. There
is danger of prosecution, and this approach will
be a viable option only if physicians are assured
of the financial and moral support of the medical
profession (especially of the ACOG) and, I think,
of the legal profession as well. I believe the Amer
ican Bar Association should agree as an organization to actively support any physician who is
prosecuted under this law for doing what he or
she believed at the time was in the patient’s best
medical interests. This strategy means that a physician who is accused of violating this law would
challenge its constitutionality as part of his or
her defense in the criminal action, what the
Court seemed to mean by an “as applied” case.
Many state legislatures will now enact new
laws restricting abortion access to see how far
they can go, just as happened after Roe. Other
states, especially those like New York that had
made abortion legal before Roe, may codify the
basic protections of Roe into state law.20 In antiRoe states, there are likely to be increased requirements for physicians to present their patients with more and more information designed
to discourage pregnant women from having abortions, such as viewing ultrasonographic images
of their fetuses. Some states will also attempt to
outlaw other abortion procedures that the members of their legislatures find personally or religiously objectionable, including standard D&E.
In the past, members of state legislatures could
vote for all sorts of restrictions and bans, knowing that the courts would almost certainly find
them unconstitutional. Thus, they could be publicly in favor of abortion restrictions and at the
same time privately assure their pro-choice constituents that such restrictions would have no effect on women. Now that states (and Congress)
have been given the green light to regulate medicine on the basis of their own views of morals
and ethics, detached from medicine and science,
these legislators may have to make real decisions.
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For the sake of their patients and the profession
of medicine, physicians will have to pay more
attention to politics.
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